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Abstract 
While climate change has largely been removed from the federal policy agenda of the United States 
in the near term, the continued reliance on fossil fuels as a dominant energy source leaves many 
analysts to conclude that climate policy will eventually reappear on that agenda. We present a review of 
recent research related to the design and implementation of one instrument for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction: offsets.  As these are implemented, policy makers must understand the way these programs 
work. In this review, we describe the basic features of carbon offset markets, along with the potential 
supply of offsets from agricultural sources and associated cost considerations. In this discussion we 
highlight the role of institutional design of contracts and transactions costs. We then turn to the benefits 
of including offsets in policies to reduce GHGs and complete the review with a discussion of the 
challenges in implementing the programs.  
1. Introduction 
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 While climate change has largely been removed from the federal policy agenda of the United 
States in the near term, the continued reliance on fossil fuels as a dominant energy source leaves many 
analysts to conclude that climate policy will eventually reappear on that agenda.  This hiatus from 
immediate policy discussion provides a window for researchers to evaluate the set of instruments that 
have been considered in these programs.  In this paper, we present a review of recent research related 
to the design and implementation of one instrument for greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction that has been 
the source of much controversy in the development of regulations: offsets.  While many types of offsets 
have been considered, we focus our discussion on agricultural offsets from domestic sources.  In 
addition to providing a set of relatively comparable offsets in which to compare findings, the offset 
potential of agriculture in the U.S. is likely to be a major focus on the next farm bill and related 
conservation programs. While not necessarily framed as “offsets,” the agricultural practices and land 
use changes that can reduce atmospheric GHGs can be addressed by other types of policy such as green 
payments and subsidies. Thus, much of the literature related to agricultural offsets is equally relevant to 
the design of conservation programs and U.S. farm policy. 
 Making this review and evaluation even more salient is the fact that climate policy is increasingly 
being taken up by states where many of the same instruments are being adopted and/or considered.  
Notably, in October of 2011, California completed its regulations to adopt a cap and trade program 
(http://arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm).   Of particular interest is the fact that the 
California program has an explicit offset program which will allow emission reductions from uncapped 
sectors to be purchased by capped industries thereby meeting their reduction requirements 
(http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/062210/offset_program_update.pdf). Specifically, 
though the California offset program is initially focused on forest offsets, ozone depleting substances, 
and livestock, the legislation allows for the possibility of additional sources of offsets over time. 
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Of course, carbon offset programs have been incorporated into the design of GHG mitigation 
policies in the international arena. Notably, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto 
Protocol has received considerable attention (Bushnell 2010; Lecocq & Ambrosi 2007 ) and proposed 
climate change policies in the United States included carbon sequestration from agricultural practices as 
potential offsets (such as H.R. 2454).  A number of offsets have been promulgated under the CDM. In 
particular, the CDM could potentially achieve an estimate of 3,000 MtCO2e savings projected to 2012 
according to project design documents (Grubb et al. 2011).  These carbon sequestration policies have 
been criticized for a variety of reasons including the high information costs required to measure their 
benefits at specific sites and the existence of information asymmetries between government and 
farmers (Antle et al. 2003), although he also notes that incentive based regulations, such as offsets, are 
more efficient than command-and-control regulations due to the variability of mitigation costs across 
sources (Antle, 2008).  These points suggest that there is ample room for researchers to explore more 
efficient ways to design carbon offset programs. Finally, as these programs are implemented, policy 
makers must understand the way agricultural carbon offset programs work, their benefits, and some of 
the challenges that will be faced in their design.   
In the remainder of this review, we begin by describing the basic features of carbon offset markets, 
along with the potential supply of offsets from agricultural sources and associated cost considerations. 
In this discussion we highlight the role of institutional design of contracts and transactions costs rather 
than the biological and physical aspects. For a very clear biological description of the process of carbon 
sequestration in soils and forests, refer to “Carbon Sequestration in Forests and Soils” by Sedjo and 
Sohngen in this volume. In addition to discussing issues related to carbon sequestration by forests and 
soils, they also provided a detailed explanation of the processes through which conservation practices 
increase soil and forest carbon sequestration (Sedjo and Sohngen 2012). Towards the end of this review, 
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we turn to the benefits of including offsets in policies to reduce GHGs and complete the review with a 
discussion of the challenges in implementing the programs.  
2. GHG offset programs in agriculture 
 As noted earlier, offsets are simply a way in which sources of emission reductions outside the 
capped sector can participate in a cap-and-trade program for an environmental good. Thus, in the 
California system for example, the capped sector covers about 85% of the GHG generating and brings 
additional sources under the cap over time. Sometimes the terminology “baseline-and-trade” is used to 
differentiate programs that provide credits to firms that reduce emissions below a baseline level. These 
reductions below the baseline are equivalent to an offset, which can then be sold to emission sources 
that exceed their baseline. 
 Offset programs may exist for many reasons including the fact that traditional regulatory 
measures are constrained by jurisdiction and practicality (Bushnell 2010).  They will be desirable for 
implementation when reductions to these outside sources can be achieved less expensively than 
reductions to the covered sources, thereby decreasing the costs of program compliance. For example, 
conservation practices that increase the storage of carbon in agricultural soils may be a less expensive 
way to keep carbon out of the atmosphere than activities from the capped sectors. There are a wide 
variety of agricultural practices and land management changes in agriculture that have been identified 
as potential sources of GHG reductions.  These include retiring land from agricultural production and 
replanting perennial cover (such as trees or perennial grasses), the addition of cover crops to standard 
cropping systems and the use of reduced tillage to increase the amount of soil organic matter and 
carbon sequestration in the soil. In addition, grazing land management and biofuel substitution are also 
identified by EPA as potential options. For representative sequestration rates from those practices see 
www.epa.gov/sequestration/rates.html.   
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2.1 Supply Curves and Spatial Heterogeneity 
 An important starting point is to determine the potential of carbon offsets from agriculture. 
Policy makers and analysts need to distinguish between technical potential and economic potential, in 
which technical potential is defined as the biophysical capacity to reduce emissions due to the different 
conservation practices (Gramig 2010).  Moreover, technical potential does not include costs and is 
affected by spatial heterogeneity (Antle 2008). On the other hand, economic potential includes cost 
effectiveness and feasibility of conservation practices. Smith et al. (2008) illustrate the difference 
between the two potentials in their assessment of carbon sequestration, which includes all GHGs with 
breakdowns for all global regions and all gases.  They estimate 2030 global technical potential to be at 
most between 5,500 to 6,000 MtCO2e/year.  Similarly, they estimate 2030 global economic potential to 
be at least 1,500 McO2e/year for a carbon price of $20/tCO2 and at most 4,300 MtCO2e/year for a price 
of $100/tCO2 (Smith et al. 2008). Clearly, economic potential is the appropriate measure that policy 
makers should consider when designing carbon offsets program.  
 Once policy makers understand the economic potential of carbon offsets from agriculture, 
supply curves are estimated to determine the amount of carbon that is sequestered given a carbon 
price. Supply curves are derived using the opportunity cost, which is basically the difference between 
the return under a current cultivation practice and the return from adopting a conservation practice. In 
other words, a farmer adopts a different practice if the opportunity cost per hectare that is changed to a 
new conservation practice is less than the payment from the offset contract (Mooney et al. 2002). For 
example, the opportunity of land retirement is measured by the cropland cash rental rate (Feng et al. 
2005). Several authors (Aldy et al. 2009; Gramig 2010; McCarl & Schneider 2001) agree that as the price 
of carbon increases, carbon offsets should originate from afforestation, since agricultural carbon 
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sequestration has lower economic potential compared to afforestation. Sedjo and Sohngen provide a 
detailed description about carbon sequestration in forests in their review in this volume.  
Antle et al. explore the way carbon supply curves are affected by spatial heterogeneity. In fact, 
they notice a negative relation between payment levels and spatial heterogeneity. In other words, as 
payment levels increase, the opportunity costs increase as well, which reduces the coefficient of 
variation in opportunity costs (Antle et al. 2003). As the land is more heterogeneous, relative efficiency 
of per hectare contracts decreases as measurement costs increase (Antle et al. 2003). They conclude 
that it is important to use carbon supply curves that are derived taking into account opportunity costs 
and spatial heterogeneity.    
 Supply curves for carbon offsets from agricultural practices have been estimated by a number of 
authors. Table 1 includes a summary of a number of recent studies which provide a range of estimates 
associated with various conservation practices.    
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Table 1 Empirical Studies 
Source Location Agricultural 
commodity 
Policy design Conservation 
practices 
Simulation 
Model or 
Methodology 
Pautsch et 
al. 2000 
Iowa Corn, 
soybean, 
wheat, 
sorghum & 
hay 
Single per acre 
subsidy & price 
discrimination 
subsidy 
Conservation Tillage Logit model of 
conservation 
tillage adoption 
  
Mooney et 
al. 2002 
Montana Small grain  20 year per-tonne 
contract in which 
areas are sampled 4 
times 
Spring wheat-
fallow, barley-
fallow, winter 
wheat-fallow, grass 
and spring wheat, 
barley, and winter 
wheat 
Century 
Antle et al. 
2003 
Northern 
Plains 
Region 
(USA) 
Dryland 
production 
systems  
20 year per-tonne 
contract in which 
areas are sampled 4 
times 
Tillage practices  Century 
Kurkalova, 
Kling & Zhao 
2004b 
Iowa Corn and 
soybean 
Green subsidies Conservation tillage EPIC 
Feng et al.  
2005 
Upper 
Mississippi 
River 
Basin 
(UMRB) 
Wheat, 
corn, 
soybean, 
and cash 
grains 
Green payment 
type policy 
Land retirement EPIC 
Kurkalova, 
Kling & Zhao 
2006 
Iowa Corn and 
soybean 
Green subsidies Conservation tillage Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimation 
Antle et al. 
2007 
Iowa Corn-soy-
feed system 
20 year per-tonne 
contract in which 
areas are sampled 4 
times 
Conservation tillage Century 
Singer, 
Nusser & Alf 
2007 
Corn Belt 
(USA) 
Wheat, 
corn, 
soybean, 
and cash 
grains 
Government 
conservation 
programs 
Cover crops Mailed Survey 
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The different studies from Table 1 provide important insights about carbon offset programs that 
are worth pointing out. Pautsch et al. (2000) estimate that the payments associated with a price 
discrimination subsidy could be up to 4.1 times lower than a single price subsidy. Mooney et al. (2002) 
use their study to verify that measuring and monitoring costs per carbon credit are inversely related to 
the price per credit. The Antle et al. (2003) study suggests the existence of a negative relation between 
payment levels and spatial heterogeneity as well as between relative efficiency of per-hectare contracts 
and spatial heterogeneity. They estimate that per hectare contracts could be as much as five times more 
costly than per-tonne contracts for the same agroecozone. Antle et al. (2007) realize that their 
aggregate econometric-process model produces a supply curve that is more elastic at low carbon prices.  
Feng et al. (2005) conclude that there is a high degree of correlation between benefits and 
costs. In other words, areas with high cost shares generally have high benefit shares. Their empirical 
results further suggest that co-benefits are likely to be sizeable in absolute magnitudes in the UMRB 
(Upper Mississippi River Basin). Singer, Nusser and Alf (2007) estimate that around 55.7% of farmers are 
willing to use cover crops as long as they are offered cost-sharing options and a minimum payment of 
$23.20ac-1 on average. Kurkalova, Kling & Zhao (2006) conclude that in order to induce the adoption of a 
conversation practice, the government could offer subsidies that overcome the adoption premium net 
of the expected gain from adoption. Furthermore, they observe that a substantial portion of the subsidy 
becomes income transfers to existing and low-cost adopters. Lastly, Kurkalova, Kling and Zhao (2004b) 
evaluate different measurement technologies under four institutional settings, which consist of the 
possible combinations between the cost discrimination or the lack of it and the payment for new 
benefits or the payment for all benefits. They conclude that if the cost of savings associated with the 
policy is high, investing in the development of improved technologies is then socially worthwhile. From 
these insights, it is clear that policy makers benefit from empirical studies and therefore should promote 
and support similar studies.  
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2.2 The Design of Carbon Offset Program from Agriculture 
 A critical role for policy makers is to design carbon contracts. In the literature, there are at least 
four distinct approaches for designing carbon contracts: a per-tonne contract approach, an output-
based-offset (OBO) approach, a principal-agent contract approach, and a dynamic abatement cost 
model approach.  Each approach is discussed next. 
2.2.1 Per-tonne Contract 
 Antle et al. (2003) and Mooney et al. (2002) suggest the usage of per-tonne contracts over per-
hectare contracts. A per-hectare contract pays the same amount per hectare for all land that is 
converted to a specific conservation practice that is under the contract. In contrast, a per-tonne contract 
pays a specific price for each tonne of carbon that is sequestered and maintained in the soil while the 
contract lasts. Thus, a per-tonne contract does not specify the conservation practice the farmer adopts, 
since this freedom allows the farmer to choose the most efficient production practice at each specific 
location.  
Both Antle et al. (2003) and Mooney et al. (2002) agree that per-tonne contracts are more 
efficient than per-hectare contracts. An important feature of per-tonne contracts is that they induce 
carbon to be sequestered up to the point where marginal cost per tonne equals market price per tonne. 
Differently, per-hectare contracts make farmers adopt a management practice without directly 
considering the amount of carbon sequestered (Mooney et al. 2002).  A major question that arises is 
whether additional monitoring and measuring costs could offset the efficiency gains of per-tonne 
contracts.  Antle et al. approach this question by proposing a useful measure of relative efficiency of 
contracts defined as the ratio of the marginal cost per-tonne contract and the marginal cost of per-
hectare contract (2003).  Using this measure, their study shows that the marginal costs per tonne of 
sequestered carbon under a per-hectare contract could be as five times higher than under a per-tonne 
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contract. This result suggests that contracting parties could potentially withstand measuring costs of 
per-tonne contracts and still attain a lower cost compared to a per-hectare contract.   
Mooney et al. arrive at a similar conclusion in which additional measuring and monitoring costs 
are unlikely to make per-tonne contracts less efficient as long as the opportunity costs of supplying 
carbon credits are very different under both contract schemes (2002). Consequently, measuring and 
monitoring costs do not seem to offset the efficiency gains of a per-tonne contract, which suggests that 
policy makers should employ this per-tonne contract schemes over per-hectare contract schemes when 
designing carbon offset programs.  
2.2.2 An Output-based Offset (OBO) Approach 
Murray and Backer (2011) contrast the usage of output-based offset (OBO) approach over an 
area-based offset (ABO) approach when designing a carbon offset program. An ABO approach is focused 
on absolute GHG reductions that are determined per hectare under the specific conservation practice. 
This approach establishes the baseline emissions and compares it to the expected emissions profile. The 
expected offset credit is then calculated as the difference between these two measures.  
The OBO approach takes a further step and establishes a baseline for yields and emissions. The 
OBO approach establishes projected emissions and projected yields to calculate the baseline emissions 
intensity, defined as the ratio between projected emissions and projected yields. A farmer who enters a 
contract agrees to reduce emissions intensity, which is attainable either by reducing net emissions or 
increasing yields. Credits are calculated as the product of actual yield and the realized difference in 
intensities.  
An advantage of the OBO approach is the inclusion of the way onsite yield changes influence 
production and emissions elsewhere. Assuming a fixed aggregate consumption demand for an 
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agricultural commodity, an improvement in onsite yield could imply less cultivated area needed 
elsewhere. As cultivated area decreases, offsite emissions decline and could be credited in the contract. 
Some concerns about the OBO approach is that it only captures potential supply shifts under a fixed 
quantity demanded, which might not be very realistic. Ideally, the contract should capture both supply 
and demand responses. Moreover, including an intensity-based offset system to a program targeting 
absolute emission reductions could be problematic as the OBO approach focuses on decreasing 
emissions intensity and not necessarily reducing total emissions.  Another concern stems from credits 
being functions of realized yields instead of expected yields, which adds an additional source of volatility 
to a measurement of offset effectiveness that is already volatile as it is. A possible solution is the 
establishment of insurance mechanisms for farmers who fail to reach GHG threshold due to unexpected 
yield losses. Murray and Backer (2011) conclude that an intensity-based approach could be more 
effective as a transitional strategy to address emissions from agriculture, but in the long term, policies 
should focused on absolute levels of emissions. 
2.2.3 Principal-Agent Contract  
 Mason and Plantinga use a principal agent framework for carbon offsets contracts to respond to 
the problem of additionality (2011)4.  Policy makers who design offset programs are faced with the fact 
that there might be unidentifiable agents who could supply carbon offsets without any payment; thus, 
they wish to avoid including those agents in paying for and crediting offsets as they do not represent 
represent “additional” carbon gains. They focus on carbon offsets from forestation to illustrate their 
approach. The principal’s objective is to maximize expected net benefits from forestation. Each contract 
has two elements: a per-unit payment or subsidy and a lump-sum transfer from the agent to the 
government. An agent’s type is defined by the amount of land the agent would place in forest in the 
                                                          
4 The problem of additionality is further discussed in Section 2.4.2 
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absence of any government subsidy. The principal is unable to observe individual types, but he knows 
the distribution of the types. An agent could guarantee a positive payoff by pretending to be a lower 
type. An incentive compatible contract induces truth telling from the agent. Using a national-level 
simulation of carbon sequestration contracts, Mason and Plantinga conclude that principal-agent 
contracts are a less costly strategy for promoting the expansion or maintenance of forests compared to 
a constant per-unit subsidy (2011). Government costs are significantly lower under an optimal contract 
compared to a uniform subsidy. Even though this analysis assumes government purchases offsets, this 
approach could easily be extended to contracts in which private agents purchase offsets.  
2.2.4 Dynamic Stochastic Abatement Cost Model 
 Fell et al. suggest the usage of a dynamic stochastic abatement cost model for policy design 
when there are correlated uncertainties in offset supply and abatement costs (2010). Their model is 
parameterized with reference to the recently proposed federal cap-and-trade legislation H.R 2454. A 
dynamic approach seems appropriate since the proposed legislation allows for permit banking and some 
form of limiting borrowing, which transforms the static cost minimization problem into a dynamic 
problem.  
They model offsets as a linear function of offset price. From the optimization process, the 
representative firm purchases offsets until the marginal cost of abatement equals twice the offset price, 
which is a result that also appears under a monopsonistic behavior. The Euler equation states that the 
marginal cost of abatement increases at the expected rate of interest except for periods in which the 
bank constraint binds. They further suggest the usage of a price collar to face the added uncertainty 
from offsets. In particular, a price collar imposes a price floor and a price ceiling on the emission 
allowance prices in a cap-and-trade system. They compare their estimates to the Energy Information 
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Administration’s (EIA’s) estimates, concluding that the supply slope for each year at the offset price is 
half of the EIA’s expected emission price for the corresponding year (Fell et al. 2010).   
 Besides these four approaches for designing carbon offset policies, there are several papers that 
list specific steps for implementing offset program (See Gramig 2010, Antle et al. 2003, Hahn & Richards 
2010, Mooney et al. 2002, Murray & Backer 2011 and Paustian et al. 2001). Table 1 summarizes some 
empirical studies on carbon offset program from agriculture.  
2.3 Benefits of Carbon Offset Programs from Agriculture 
 In order to truly understand whether carbon offsets from agriculture should be included in 
environmental programs, policy makers must understand the benefits of the programs and potential 
issues that arise. In this section we identify the benefits of establishing carbon offsets programs from 
agriculture that a range of authors have described.  Following this, potential issues and challenges that 
policy makers could face when designing and implementing carbon offset programs are discussed. For 
instance, carbon offset programs reduce compliance costs and provide time to develop better 
technologies to adapt to a new low-carbon economy (Murray & Jenkins 2010). On a related theme, as 
better technology is developed, future emission costs could decrease (Paustian et al. 2001). 
2.3.1 Co-benefits and Complementary Relationships 
Other authors have pointed out that, in order to truly comprehend the potential impacts of 
carbon offset programs from agriculture, policy makers must consider co-benefits and complementary 
relationships that arise from the programs. To begin with, there are several co-benefits that are related 
to environmental goods. Kurkalova, Kling & Zhao (2004a) study environmental benefits from 
conservation tillage in Iowa. They focus on four performance-based benefits: carbon sequestration, 
reduction in nitrogen runoff, reduction of soil erosion by wind, and reduction of soil erosion by water.  
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They contrast a practice-based policy and a performance-based policy. The latter pays for the adoption 
of a practice, but it targets farmers that can provide the highest amount of benefit per dollar spent. 
They find that targeting carbon leads to the reduction in nitrogen runoff, wind erosion, and water 
erosion compared to a practice-based targeting. In addition, targeting a single environmental benefit 
results in higher percentages of the other three benefits compared to the case in which they all are 
targeted directly.  
Besides environmental co-benefits, several authors have identified other types of co-benefits. 
Feng et al. identify two co-benefits: an income support co-benefit and a pricing co-benefit (2005). The 
first is defined as the additional amount obtained by the farmer after receiving the full opportunity cost 
of a new practice. The latter is defined as the benefits for farmers that arise from having higher 
agricultural commodities prices. They perform a study in the Upper Mississippi River Basin (UMRB) and 
conclude that the distribution of benefits is very uneven across geographical areas. They also observe 
that targeting benefits generally enrolls more land than targeting area and that co-benefits are likely to 
be sizable in absolute magnitudes in the UMRB (Feng et al. 2005). 
Similarly, McCarl and Schneider explore co-benefits from agriculture and forestation (AF) carbon 
programs (2001). They observe that the interdependence between AF-based environmental impacts 
calls for a combined conservation policy, which could be more efficient than focusing on environmental 
goals separately. Elbakidze and McCarl study a specific example in which a power plant can purchase 
sequestration-based agricultural permits to avoid reducing its own emissions (2004). As the plant is able 
to purchase permits, its emissions could actually increase. Empirical work suggests that increased power 
plant activity generates additional environmental co-costs. After estimating the co-costs and co-
benefits, they conclude that agriculture co-benefits could potentially be offset by nonagricultural costs. 
From these examples, it is clear that considering co-benefits and co-costs is important when designing 
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programs. However, measuring these co-effects and comparing them is a difficult task since they are 
highly dependent on the specific situation and its characteristics (Elbakidze & McCarl 2004). 
2.3.2 Double Dipping and Welfare Analysis 
 Woodward explores possible benefits from allowing double dipping in offset programs in a first 
best and second best economy (Woodward & Han2004; Woodward 2011). Double dipping exists when 
providers of environmental credits are able to sell credits in multiple markets (Woodward 2011) 
associated with the same adoption of a conservation practice. An example might be the ability of a 
farmer to sell carbon credits from the adoption of no-till in both a carbon market and a water quality 
trading program.  As double dipping is allowed, returns on credits increase encouraging more farmers to 
join those credit programs, which ultimately benefits the environment.  In a first best economy, double 
dipping is efficient as long as aggregate caps are set optimally, meaning that they are set where the 
marginal benefit from the joint production of pollutant equals the marginal cost. Note, typically, the 
levels are set where marginal benefit equals marginal cost pollutant by pollutant, ignoring joint effects 
and interactions between pollutants.  
In a second best economy, polluters can emit two pollutants. The regulation of one pollutant 
brings abatement on the other pollutant and caps are set pollutant by pollutant. However, note that 
ideally, the true social marginal cost must include the free abatement from the second pollutant. Since 
the cap level is not set optimally (i.e. ignoring abatement of second pollutant), welfare loss emerges. The 
assessment of double dipping’s social loss is based on the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal 
benefit curves. If the marginal benefit is steep, then it is more efficient to prohibit double dipping. If the 
marginal benefit is flatter, then double dipping is more efficient (Woodward & Han 2004). As the MC 
curve becomes flatter, double dipping becomes the less expensive way to achieve a level of abatement 
(Woodward 2011). 
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 Besides Woodward, other authors explore welfare implications of carbon offset programs from 
agriculture. Murray and Jenkins (2010) point out that when either additionality or leakage is ignored, a 
deadweight loss to society emerges. Hahn and Richards argue that it is possible that the costs to society 
are higher than the benefits from an offset program. In fact, they claim that offsets are usually an 
inefficient way of providing subsidies for particular kinds of energy sources (2010).  In the following 
section, issues that arise when designing carbon offset programs are discussed.  
2.4 Issues to be Addressed in Offset Design 
 The uncertainty that surrounds the design of carbon offset programs raises several challenging 
issues that must be addressed before an efficient program can be developed. These issues include 
additionality, leakage, permanence, measuring and monitoring costs, and distributional effects. This 
section explores these issues and discusses possible solutions in turn.  
2.4.1 Additionality  
 A major issue that arises when designing carbon offset programs from agriculture is 
additionality (Garmig 2010). Mason and Plantinga characterize carbon offsets as impure public goods, in 
which there are some unidentifiable agents who could supply the public good without any payment 
(2011). The government should design a carbon offset program in such a way that it avoids payments for 
non-additional offsets. Otherwise, substantial costs could be associated with the purchase of offsets that 
are not generating any real environmental benefit. Policy makers face the challenge of distinguishing 
which offsets are in fact additional, since many farmers might be willing to adopt a specific conservation 
practice in the absence of a carbon offset program.  
The problem of additionality is closely related to the establishment of the baseline beyond 
which offsets are earned. Baselines cannot be directly observed since they are the amount of emissions 
in the absence of an offset system (Bushnell 2010) and are therefore subject to uncertainty.  Aldy et al. 
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discuss the importance of setting the baseline correctly when designing carbon offset program (2009). 
Moreover, Fell et al. discuss uncertainty in baseline emissions and uncertainty in offset supply. Due to 
the correlation between emission levels and economic activities, shocks to the baseline emissions are 
assumed as temporally correlated and are modeled through an AR(1) process (2009). They propose the 
usage of a price collar in their dynamic stochastic cost model to face the uncertainty from baseline 
emissions and from offset supply. The implementation and implications of using a price collar were 
discussed under Section 2.2.4.      
Bushnell explores the implications of moral hazard and adverse selection in carbon offset 
programs (2010). The latter occurs when the government ends up paying too much to farmers with 
already low emissions. The former occurs when farmers actively try to inflate their baseline.  Bushnell 
claims that adverse selection is strongly linked to the distribution of “errors” in the forecast of BAU 
emissions. Specifically, if the errors are assumed to be independently distributed, offsets can produce 
under-abatement.  Alternatively, if the errors are assumed to be highly correlated, aggregate baseline 
information is revealed He proposes the usage of randomized trials as a tool to address adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Bushnell 2010).  
Hahn and Richards discuss concerns about adverse selection, moral hazard and information 
asymmetries and propose possible solutions as well (2010).  For moral hazard and adverse selection, the 
offset program could provide sufficient property rights to all offsetting parties. For information 
asymmetries, the program could gather better information to determine the baseline. It could also limit 
the eligibility for trading offsets (Hahn & Richards 2010). Mason and Plantinga notice the presence of 
information asymmetries between the principal and the agents and use an incentive compatible 
principal-agent dynamic contract to solve this problem (2011).  
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Murray and Jenkins approach the problem of additionality by contrasting a perfect offset 
program with an imperfect offset program (2010). They define a perfect offset program to be one in 
which the offset function represents true marginal abatement cost from the uncapped sector. An 
imperfect offset program is one that contains additionality and leakage. They define additional 
reductions as those that are different from business as usual (BAU) reductions. Ignoring additionality 
could create a deadweight loss to society.  
 Murray and Jenkins take a further step and propose three policy approaches to correct welfare 
distortions from additionality (2010). First, they propose to eliminate BAU abatement from use as credit 
through the usage of additionality tests such as a financial assessment test determining which land use 
is more profitable. Alternatively, the program could enforce limit-entry criteria in which projects with 
low probabilities of being additional are denied entrance. They also suggest that setting a specific start 
date before the policy is introduced avoids strategic actions in anticipation of the policy. By removing 
the BAU abatement from offset credits, capped sectors are forced to compensate the reduction by 
having a higher abatement level that achieves the compliance cap. They conclude that BAU abatement 
should be eliminated from offset programs as long as this can be done in a costless manner.  
The second approach is to accept the existence of all offsets (including non-additional offsets) 
but apply a discount factor to issued credits to take into account the likelihood that some of the offsets 
will in actually be non-additional. In this case, the regulator establishes a discount factor on all credits 
proportional to estimates of how many credits are likely to be non-additional (i.e. the regulator requires 
more than one unit of abatement for every issued credit). For example, suppose a regulator estimates 
that 20% of all offsets are non-additional. Then, the regulator requires that only 80% of any given offset 
can be bought or sold in the market. Overall, this approach can be expected to incur higher costs to 
reach an abatement target compared to the case in which the regulator can identify which offsets are 
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indeed additional. By discounting, offset buyers experience a welfare loss and offset producer surplus 
increases compared to the case when all offsets are genuinely additional (Murray & Jenkins 2010).  
The last approach consists of addressing additionality indirectly by tightening the aggregate 
emissions cap. A regulator estimates the abatement lost due to additionality and then adjusts the cap to 
reflect this loss (i.e. if the estimation is large, the regulator can increase the cap accordingly). Continuing 
with the previous example, a regulator can raise the emissions cap 20% and give full credit for carbon 
sequestration. An increase in the cap shifts the demand for offsets out. This approach increases the total 
economy-wide obligation for offsets, but if the estimate of nonadditionality is correct, then the actual 
abatement achieved will just meet the target. In particular, capped sectors will have to do more 
abatement as well as seek more abatement from uncapped sectors through offsets. The intuition is 
simple: as the offsets supply curve does not change as producers are not affected directly, the shift in 
demand brings about more offsets.  
To meet the target, Murray and Jenkins argue that there could be less uncertainty in meeting 
the target using this approach compared to the second approach. Requiring more abatement increases 
the demand for offsets only. More offsets are produced in response to higher prices driven by the 
demand increase, which increases the initial producer surplus. Under this approach, offset providers are 
the most benefited due to the increase in price and quantity of credits sold (Murray & Jenkins 2010).   
2.4.2 Leakage 
A third challenge faced by policy makers is to take into account leakage when designing the 
carbon offset program (Aldy et al 2009). Leakage captures the idea that offset-driven carbon 
sequestration gains could be shifted to another uncapped source that increases emissions. Taking into 
account leakage is crucial for determining the offsetting validity of the program (Murray & Jenkins 
2010). 
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Measuring leakage contains a high degree of uncertainty. As with additionality, Murray and 
Jenkins propose approaches to correct for welfare distortions caused by leakage. Their first approach 
suggests that policy makers could address leakage at a project level by enhancing monitoring systems 
and policy design. They could also address it by establishing “leakage belts” or by adjusting crediting at a 
project level. This project level approach is limited because it is unable to consider leakage that goes 
beyond a local area. Likewise, it is costly due to substantial transaction costs from monitoring leakage on 
a project-to-project basis. Their second strategy consists on discounting all credits to account for leakage 
using a similar approach as with additionality. Their third approach is based on broadening an offset 
program to include more uncapped sectors or by enlarging a regulatory cap to include uncapped 
activities (Murray & Jenkins 2010). Alternatively, Murray and Backer claim that OBO could potentially 
eliminate the need for a leakage discounting and that OBO credits implicitly capture leakage effects in 
onsite crediting (2011). They focus on supply responses, but ignore demand response, which is a major 
limitation of their model. Leakage is certainly another major issue that policy makers must address when 
designing carbon offset programs.  
2.4.3 Permanence  
Carbon sequestering activities in agriculture are subject to the problem of nonpermanence. 
When carbon is built up in the soil via reduced tillage or other practice, there is the potential for it to be 
released if the practice is not continued. Thus, if reduced tillage is practiced for several years, but then 
the soil is tilled, much of the stored carbon will be released into the atmosphere, making the GHG 
reductions only temporary. For a biological description of this problem, refer to Sedjo and Sohgen’s 
review in this volume as they clearly describe the biological process behind carbon sequestration. 
Paustian et al. discuss the concern about the permanence of carbon in the soil and further note that the 
soil has a limiting capacity to hold carbon (2001) so even if a practice like reduced tillage is continued, 
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there is a maximum carrying capacity of the soil. They note that temporary storage has value due to 
discounting on the flow of carbon. From a stock pollutant perspective, temporary storage has value even 
without social discounting, since carbon decreases the stock for the period in which carbon is stored 
(Paustian et al. 2001).   
The problem of permanence has received considerable discussion and authors have noted that 
contracts can be written to account for this problem. Feng, Zhao and Kling (2002) emphasize the need 
for government programs to properly account for the “net value” of temporary storage of carbon. They 
suggest three systems to implement the optimal sequestration levels: a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, a 
variable-length contract (VLC) system, and a carbon annuity account (CAA) system. Under a PAYG 
system, emission credits are sold and repurchased by farmers based on the permanent reduction of 
carbon. Alternatively, under a VLC system, private broker arrangements generate “permanent” carbon 
reductions that stem from separate temporary reductions. Lastly, under a CAA system, the amount of 
carbon sink is paid the full value of a permanent reduction as in the PAYG, but this payment is deposited 
into an annuity account instead of being given to the farmer as in the PAYG. These three systems attain 
the theoretically efficient solution.  
Feng (2005) explores different carbon accounting methods to address the nonpermanence 
nature of carbon sinks. The three accounting methods she studies are: (1) annual average carbon, (2) 
annualized carbon, and (3) ton-year carbon. The annual average carbon is the sum of carbon 
sequestered over a specific period of time divided by the length of the period. The annualized carbon 
method discounts carbon sequestered in future periods. Lastly, the ton-year carbon accounting 
considers the duration of carbon kept away from the atmosphere. Feng (2005) concludes that the 
optimal accounting method tends to be study specific. 
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Murray, Sohngen and Ross (2007) also address the problem of nonpermanence as farmers can 
switch back to a conventional practice and release some sequestered carbon back into the atmosphere. 
They propose three project credit adjustments to account for the nonpermanence of soil carbon sinks: 
(1) comprehensive accounting, (2) ex ante discounting accounting, and (3) temporary credit accounting. 
Comprehensive accounting is based on the balance between credits that are given as carbon is stored 
and debits that are given as carbon is released back into the atmosphere. This accounting method 
requires regular carbon stock measurements.  Alternatively, the ex ante discounting method estimates 
the expected amount and timing of carbon release, which is accounted for at the beginning of the 
project when credits are assigned to the contract. Note that this method is based on the assumption 
that carbon will be released at a certain time, but there could be times in which carbon is not released 
into the atmosphere. Lastly, temporary credit accounting assigns finite life on debits and credits.  
García-Oliva and Masera (2004) also stress the importance of considering the nonpermanence 
of carbon sinks when designing carbon offset programs. They propose ways to account for the 
reversibility of carbon sequestration. Specifically, they suggest that projects must demonstrate financial, 
legal and technical viability and capacity. They also stress the need for a clear definition of liability and a 
detailed risk management plan (i.e. insurance, credit reverses or buffers) to account for the 
nonpermanence of carbon in the soil. Overall, despite the concern about permanence, there is value for 
the temporary storage of carbon in the soil. 
2.4.4 Measuring and Monitoring Costs 
 Following the discussion on per-tonne contracts under Section 2.2.1, concerns are raised about 
measuring and monitoring cost (Antle 2008; Antle et al. 2003). Paustian et al. emphasize the importance 
of measuring sequestration and emission rates in carbon offset programs, since GHG emissions are 
nonpoint source pollutants (2001). They suggest that monitoring programs could be based on aggregate 
23 
 
pollution and observable individual actions. Antle et al. suggest to measure the amount of soil C 
sequestered by sampling and estimating the average C accumulation of each practice in a relatively 
homogenous agroecozone (2003).  Alternatively, Mooney et al. propose that in order to monitor that 
farmers are using an eligible practice, programs could use remote sensing, aerial photography or drive 
by inspection (2002).   
2.4.5 Distributional Effects 
 Similar to the way carbon offset programs have co-benefits, they also have co-costs. Elbakidze 
and McCarl’s empirical work on the power plant example discussed in Section 2.3.1 suggest that 
agricultural co-benefits could potentially be offset by nonagricultural co-costs (2004). Co-costs from 
carbon offset programs have distributional effects. For instance, carbon offset programs benefit farmers 
through the increase in prices, but this increase harms consumers (McCarl & Schneider 2001). Murray 
and Jenkins realize that their three approaches to additionality have different distributional results. 
Offset suppliers are better off with the discounting approach as producer surplus is higher. They are 
even better off under the cap adjustment approach since it induces the highest producer surplus. At the 
same time, these gains make offset buyers in the capped sector worse off as they face larger payments 
(Murray & Jenkins 2010).  Thus, carbon offset programs could induce some distributional effects.  
3. Conclusion 
While climate change does not seem to be getting substantial attention in the current federal policy 
agenda of the United, the offset potential of agriculture is likely to play a significant role on the next 
farm bill and related conservation programs. Offsets are desirable for implementation when reductions 
to outside sources can be achieved less expensively than reductions to the covered sources, thereby 
decreasing the costs of program compliance. Before designing carbon offsets, policy makers need to 
understand the economic potential of carbon offsets from agriculture. Once the potential is estimated, 
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supply curves are derived to determine the amount of carbon that is sequestered given a carbon price. 
Policy makers can use these supply curves to design carbon contracts. In this paper, we review four 
distinct approaches for designing carbon contracts: a per-tonne contract approach, an output-based-
offset (OBO) approach, a principal-agent contract approach, and a dynamic abatement cost model 
approach.  
When designing carbon contracts, policy makers must consider co-benefits and complementary 
relationships that arise from the programs. Similarly, they must understand the challenges that are 
faced while designing offset programs. The uncertainty that surrounds the design of carbon offset 
programs raises several challenging issues that must be addressed before an efficient program can be 
developed. This review explores challenges and solutions for problems such as additionality, leakage, 
permanence, measuring and monitoring costs, and distributional effects. In the end, this review 
provides a comprehensive overview of carbon offsets from agriculture that includes the various 
elements that must be considered when designing an efficient carbon offset program.  
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